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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO INDUCE LIVE DONOR
KIDNEY DONATION: SCHOLARSHIPS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE GIFT OF
LIFE
WALTER K. GRAHAM* & JASON P. LIVINGSTON**

I. INTRODUCTION
The need for increasing the supply of transplantable kidneys is great.
There are now more than 80,000 patients on the national waiting list for
kidney transplants.1 At the end of 2005, there were approximately 341,000
patients in the United States suffering from end stage renal disease and
receiving dialysis treatment, most of whom had not been listed for a
transplant.2 Increasing the number of kidneys available for transplantation
is imperative. The authors applaud Mr. Linford’s creative efforts to address
this critical need.3 Nevertheless, we cannot endorse his proposal.
Proposals to offer financial incentives to help alleviate the acknowledged
organ shortage are not new and have taken many forms.4 Outright cash
payments occupy the most obvious end of the financial incentive spectrum,

* Executive Director of United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS); B.S. 1971, Arkansas; J.D.
1975. The authors appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments but do so in their
personal capacities and not on behalf of United Network for Organ Sharing.
** Legal Counsel, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS); B.S. 1994, Virginia Tech; J.D.
1997, University of Richmond.
1. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Current U.S. Waiting List (by
Organ), at www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (follow “Waiting List”; then follow
“Registrations”; then follow “Overall by Organ”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
2. NAT’L KIDNEY FOUND., FACT SHEET: END STAGE RENAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2008), at www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/fs_new/esrdinUS.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
3. Jake Linford, The Kidney Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can
Provide Financial Incentives for Kidney Donations While Preserving Altruistic Meaning, 2 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 (2009).
4. See, e.g., E.A. Friedman & A.L. Friedman, Payment for Donor Kidneys: Pros and
Cons, 69 KIDNEY INT’L 960, 961 (2006) (proposing to increase the pool of transplantable
kidneys by legalizing sale and establishing a fair market price); Francis L. Delmonico et al.,
Ethical Incentives – Not Payment – For Organ Donation, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2002 (2002)
(describing various proposals to increase the supply of transplantable kidneys including donor
medals of honor, reimbursement for funeral expenses, organ exchanges, donor insurance,
and ensuring access to organs for previous donors).
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while consideration such as lifetime health insurance benefits, given to the
living donor to address the clear risks and disincentives attendant to the
organ donation, occupy the other end.5 Presently, the law prohibiting
valuable consideration in exchange for organs allows for little flexibility.6 In
the past the law has even frustrated innovative attempts to transplant donor
organs, such as paired kidney donations. Mr. Linford’s proposal to offer
college scholarships as an incentive for organ donation calls to mind the
current, spirited debate over the propriety of giving financial incentives to
individuals who donate a kidney.7 The Executive Committee of United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and its Board of Directors recently
decided against taking a position in the debate because, inter alia, it could
conflict with UNOS’s role as the federal contractor operating the national
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which oversees
living and deceased donor transplantation in the United States.8 Neither
UNOS nor the OPTN has taken a position regarding the issue of financial
incentives. The decision as to whether such incentives should be given to
potential donors is one better left to society as a whole rather than the
organization that serves as the steward of donated organs and is charged
with their equitable allocation among patients who are waiting for a
transplant.
The goal of this essay is not to respond to the many known and
unknown operational challenges of a scholarship incentive, but instead to

5. See generally Friedman & Friedman, supra note 4, at 962 (arguing that legalizing
financial incentives for donation will eliminate black markets, create a safer organ supply, and
help ease the shortage of viable organs); A.P. Monaco, Rewards for Organ Donation: The
Time Has Come, 69 KIDNEY INT’L 955 passim (2006) (proposing financial compensation that
is more nuanced than the traditional “buying and selling” proposals); Arthur J. Matas, The
Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections and Concerns, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION
2007, 2008-09 (2004) (arguing for the legalization of payments for donations, but focusing
on regulation to ensure safety and non-exploitation).
6. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000) (making it
“unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce.”).
7. See Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippen, When Altruism Is Not Enough: The
Worsening Organ Shortage and What It Means for the Elderly, 15 ELDER L.J. 153, 196-97
n.265 (2007) (listing the plethora of publications debating the various donation incentive
proposals); Delmonico et al., supra note 4, at 2003-04 (discussing several ethical incentives
to increase organ donation).
8. See generally Press Release, United Network for Organ Sharing, UNOS Again
Receives National Transplant Network Contract (Oct. 3, 2005), at www.unos.org/news/news
Detail.asp?id=492 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (stating that UNOS has been awarded the
federal contract to supervise the nation’s OPTN).
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offer the personal perspectives of the authors who have broad knowledge of
the debate regarding incentives for organ donation.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Mr. Linford does not suggest that living donor organ donation will
supplant deceased donor organ donation, but rather that the financial
incentive program will increase the volume of living donations to close the
gap between the existing supply of transplantable organs and the need for
those organs as quantified by the number of candidates on the waiting list.
A purely economic analysis of this gap between supply and demand might
suggest that an appropriate incentive could motivate potential donors who
would not otherwise donate to do so.9
A.

Arguments Favoring Financial Incentives

The criticisms of the present system based upon altruism are welldefined,10 and the unfortunate consequence of failing to adequately resolve
the shortage of organs for transplantation is, and will be, the multiplication
of suffering by candidates on the waiting list and the stark reality that many
people will die while waiting for a suitable donor organ. Proponents of
systems to provide financial incentives suggest that the current altruismbased system is inadequate to meet the current demand for donor organs,
and that demographic data suggests that this disparity is growing.11 It is
argued that the results of an increased disparity between supply and
demand engender many unsatisfactory consequences, including but not
limited to the following:
 “[A]n expansion of time on the waiting list which effectively excludes the
vast majority of patients on dialysis without a living donor”;
 “[R]ecipients who are older and sicker when they come up for
transplantation as a consequence of their extended vintage on dialysis”;

9. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 67 (18th ed.,
2004) (describing basic supply and demand theories and applications); Richard A. Epstein,
The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ Transplantation, 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. 459, 465-66 (2008) (discussing how to model supply and demand for organ
donation under different arrangements).
10. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 460-61 (noting that altruism for organ donation is not
the most efficient method to govern the current regime of organ transplantation).
11. See Laura Meckler, Kidney Shortage Inspires a Radical Idea: Organ Sales, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 2007, at A1 (describing how the gap between kidney supply and demand has
increased); Gabriel M. Danovitch, Cultural Barriers to Kidney Transplantation: A New Frontier,
84 TRANSPLANTATION 462, 462 (2007) (explaining that only a system of financial incentives
will work to increase organ donation).
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 “[I]ncreasing emotional pressure on any available [living] donor to
donate and the consequent strain on the altruistic features of donor
motivation”;
 “[A]n upsurge in the practice of international organ trafficking [–]
traveling to a developing country for the purpose of purchasing an organ
in which the incentives for vendors are to avoid disclosing co-morbid
conditions, brokers to suppress any information which might interfere with
a successful transaction and recipients not to disclose the transaction for
fear of prosecution or ostracism by health care professionals”; and
 “[A] proliferation of the . . . desperate public solicitations of organs on
the internet and elsewhere.”12

It has been suggested that the straightforward application of the
principles of supply and demand will cure the growing shortage of organs
for transplantation.13 That is, a live donor would be willing to take on
certain risks to part with a priceless and lifesaving donor organ for an
appropriate price. Under the present system based upon altruism, the
appropriate “price” might be the joy of prolonging the life of a family
member suffering from organ failure or the sense of self-fulfillment
experienced by the infrequent live donor that does not direct a specific
recipient of their donated organ.14 The issue is the appropriate price that
society is willing to tolerate while people are dying waiting for a life saving
organ. Through the prohibition against valuable consideration contained in
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),15 society has expressed a
preference in favor of the altruism-based organ donation system.16 This
societal preference may not be absolute. Proponents of the current
altruism-based system insist that it has not reached its full potential to
recover donor organs. However, seventeen people die every day waiting for
the organ offer that will never come and despite worthy efforts to maximize
12. Organ Transplantation and Procurement—Policy Proposals: Hearing Before
President’s Council on Bioethics (June 22, 2006) (testimony of Benjamin E. Hippen, M.D.,
Transplant Nephrologist, Metrolina Nephrology Associates), at www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/
june06/session4.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Hippen Testimony].
13. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, INST. OF MED., ORGAN
DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, REPORT BRIEF 1 (2006), available at www.iom.edu/
Object.file/Master/34/281/organdonationforweb.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009); Epstein,
supra note 9, at 465-66.
14. See generally Gilbert Meilaender, Gifts of the Body, NEW ATLANTIS, Summer 2006, at
25, 32-33 (considering the personal fulfillment donors may experience from donating
organs); Satel & Hippen, supra note 7, at 192 (noting that participants in surveys and social
psychology experiments are less willing to perform a task they had already agreed to do for
free if it came with an offer of money).
15. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
16. See Friedman & Friedman, supra note 4, at 961 (discussing the various national and
international movements in support of the NOTA prohibition of organ sales).
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the number of organs recovered, it is generally accepted that the disparity
between the supply and demand for transplantable organs continues to
grow.17 Would society hold fast to this prohibition if the daily death toll
continued its slow climb to fifty or hundred deaths per day? “[W]e need not
rely on thought experiments or on heavily qualified examples from social
science to realize the repugnant future consequences of more of the
same.”18 Even though death may not be a “[p]roblem to [b]e [s]olved”,19
preventable deaths should never be tolerated.
B.

Arguments Against Financial Incentives

Despite [various] proposals for pilot studies, compelling arguments
against financial incentives for organ donation have been eloquently made
since this concept was last considered by the UNOS Ethics Committee.20
Practical questions as to the source and amount of compensation, when
during the process it would be offered, and how the system would be
administered are raised first.
Moreover, those against financial incentives base their objections
primarily on the argument that the current altruistic system has not failed as
much as it has not been fully promoted. To support this position, it has
been suggested that donation rates could decrease under such a system due
to a backlash and losses from the current donor pool based on pure
altruistic giving. Actually, it could be argued, this altruism extends beyond
the donor and the donor family to include many others (neurosurgeons,
neurologists, emergency room and intensive care nurses, etc.) who
participate in the donation process without added compensation. In fact,
anecdotal reports from organ donor families indicate that such incentives
would be interpreted as “repayment” and would have changed their
response to request for donation due to a perceived or real element of
coercion.
Opponents of financial incentives point out that there would be
potentially decreased emotional gain for the donor family, decreased
respect for life and the sanctity of the human body, and a loss of the
personal link that currently exists in the donation process. Great concern

17. Id. at 960.
18. B.E. Hippen & R.S. Gaston, The Conspicuous Costs of More of the Same, 6 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1503, 1504 (2006).
19. Meilaender, supra note 14, at 26-28.
20. The following five paragraphs are reproduced from EDWARD W. NELSON ET AL.,
PAYMENT SUBCOMM., UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING (UNOS), FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FOR ORGAN DONATION (1993), at www.unos.org/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4 (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009). UNOS provides this information to the public to stimulate discussion
about the issue of financial incentives for organ donation.
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has also been expressed regarding a potential rich versus poor phenomena
and the fact that financial need should not be linked in a coercive way to
giving consent for organ procurement. Ironically, such incentives directed
primarily at [minority] communit[ies] would undoubtedly recall for many the
past experience of “commerce in bodies” that is unfortunately a part of our
country’s history.
Beyond theoretical concerns, those opposed to financial incentives for
organ donation predict the potential loss of control of this process to
government bureaucracies and “organ brokers” with tremendous increase in
administrative requirements and therefore cost. Such money would be
better spent on more education for the public and the medical communities
regarding the need for organ donation via the current system and the
benefit to society as a whole through this process.
Beyond the fact that proposed incentives may actually prove to be
disincentives to potential donors, it has been argued that financial gain by
the donor family does not address the problem that many potential donor
families are never asked [about their desire to donate]. This failure by the
medical community to participate in the donation process would not be
addressed by incentives directed at the potential donor alone. Finally, not
unlike the criticisms directed at the results of recent public opinion polls,
those against financial incentives point out that field tests of such proposals
would not measure all the possible effects and yet risk losing the best parts
of the current system.
Opponents of financial incentives in general and Mr. Linford’s proposed
scholarship incentive system would argue that such a system is unjust
because the natural and expected typical donor under that system would be
among the most disadvantaged members of our society.21 That is, any type
of financial incentive is going to appeal to the least affluent families that
likely have the least knowledge about other options to fund higher
education. While higher education is an admirable goal, any financial
incentive system will not be able to overcome this fundamental shortcoming.
A strong case can be made for helping the poor through the removal of
disincentives to donation22 as described infra without such a coercive effect.
While the number of organs donated, lives extended, and the amount of
money saved by organ transplantation can be quantified, many facets of
organ transplantation defy economic analysis. “The fundamental truths of
our society, of life and liberty, are values that should not have a monetary
price. These values are degraded when a poor person feels compelled to
risk death for the sole purpose of obtaining monetary payment for a body
21. Benjamin Hippen, The Case for Kidney Markets, NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2006, at 47, 60;
Satel & Hippen, supra note 7, at 198.
22. See infra Section IV, Subsection A (Removal of Disincentives to Donation).
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part.”23 An educational benefit can be seen as simply an alternative to a
direct monetary payment—a benefit that will appeal to the poor person who
might otherwise have used the direct monetary payment to further their
education but a poor person nonetheless.
Ethicists also argue that a system of financial incentives would
commodify the body.24 Arguments can be made that the right of individual
autonomy should permit the sale of human organs and tissues, much the
same way as markets exist for blood products and reproductive cells
voluntarily provided from living vendors. This right of autonomy is limited.
Consider the following examples: a parent should not be permitted to
donate their heart to their sick child; prostitution is illegal in most states; and
persons should not be allowed to sell themselves into indentured servitude.
III. LIVING DONATION
Organs for transplantation are recovered either from deceased donors
or from living donors.25 Living donation involves the voluntary and informed
consent to injure the living donor’s body “in order to relieve the suffering or
preserve the life of another (usually, though not always, another to whom
one is closely bound by ties of kinship or affection).”26 Mr. Linford’s
proposal is limited to providing a financial incentive for kidney donation
from living donors.27 It is important to note that kidney donation is not
without risk for the donor. Between 1999 and 2007, there were thirteen
living donors who died in the United States within thirty days following
surgery.28 The death of a kidney donor immediately following surgery
occurred in 2008.29 Data collected by UNOS between 2005 and 2007
indicate there were 768 adverse medical events within six weeks following
surgery, including hospital readmissions and reoperations.30 The decision
to remove a kidney from a healthy patient is not one to be made lightly or
under coercive circumstances. Due to the risks described above, it is
imperative that treating physicians and surgeons have access to absolutely
truthful and complete information from the donor during the pre-surgical
workup in order to minimize those risks.

23. Delmonico et al., supra note 4, at 2004.
24. John H. Evans, Commodifying Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding Financial
Incentives for Organ Donation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1003, 1003-04 (2003).
25. Meilaender, supra note 14 at 29, 32-33.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Linford, supra note 3, at 272.
28. Data on file with authors.
29. Susan Edelman, Kidney OP Gave Her Life, But Took Her Love – Husband Made
Ultimate Sacrifice for Wife, N.Y. POST, Dec. 21, 2008, at 19.
30. Data on file with authors.
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In addition, although rare, living kidney donors have developed end
stage renal disease in their remaining kidney requiring that they receive a
kidney transplant.31 “The need for a transplant in a previous kidney donor
should constitute the highest priority in the allocation of organs.”32
There are many benefits to the individual recipient of the living donor
kidney transplant, as well as benefits to the pool of candidates waiting for
an appropriate donor kidney. Living kidney donation comprises an
increasing percentage of the total kidneys donated per year.33
Proponents of the current altruism-based system of living donation will
note several advantages that would be compromised by a shift to an
incentive-based system including the following:
 The total number of available organs may decrease as a result of
providing financial incentives through a reduction in the current rates of
deceased and living donation;34
 The United States system could become flooded by foreign nationals
wishing to enter the country, which could overwhelm the current system.35
One result could be that restrictions would be placed on the number of
transplants36 for people with end stage renal disease because of their
country of origin, or in the absence of such quotas, that waiting times for
Americans could increase;
 Financial incentives might expand the pool of potential organ transplant
candidates to include the old and infirm that might not otherwise seek an
organ transplant in the current system;37 and
 Financial incentives increase pressure and the likelihood that a
prospective donor might be less than candid when disclosing their
medical history to avoid being disqualified; this increases the risk to
recipients of donor-transmitted diseases;38
31. Delmonico et al., supra note 4, at 2004.
32. Id.
33. See California Pacific Med. Ctr., Living Kidney Donation, at www.cpmc.org/
advanced/kidney/patients/topics/living_donation.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (noting that
living kidney donation has increased to more than forty percent of all kidney donations).
34. See Evans, supra note 24, at 1022-23 (discussing that direct or indirect policies of
commodification will cause a decrease in the number of organs that are donated due to
people finding such policies repulsive); NELSON ET AL., supra note 20 (explaining that organ
donation rates could decrease under a financial incentive based system).
35. See, e.g., Danovitch, supra note 11, at 463 (discussing kidney “transplant tourism,”
where people travel abroad to buy kidneys and receive transplants in China).
36. See id. (“[T]he number of living donor transplants in Hong-Kong has decreased and is
now only 15% to 20% of all kidney transplants performed there.”).
37. See Satel & Hippen, supra note 7, at 156-57 & fig.1 (detailing that more elderly
individuals are being considered for organ transplantation).
38. See id. at 190 (noting that the American system of blood procurement, which is partly
commercialized and financially based, is more likely to contain blood that is contaminated).
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Proponents of a regulated incentive-based system of acquiring kidneys
from living organ vendors argue that such a system may have several
potential advantages over the present altruism-based combination of living
and deceased donors including the following:
 “[A]n increase in the [total] number of organs available for
transplantation on a scale that more plausibly approaches the current
and future demand”;
 “[A] concomitant reduction perhaps even elimination of the root cause of
international organ trafficking and unregulated internet solicitation”;
 “The opportunity for truly altruistic living donors to donate largely free of
the incessant moral and emotional pressures of the desperation of their
designated recipient[s]”;
 “[A]n increase in the frequency of preemptive transplantation which
confer graphs of rival benefit that exceeds transplantation after any
amount of time on dialysis”;
 “[T]he identification of a cohort of living vendors who are at the very
lowest risk for long-term adverse outcomes eliminating another
competing pressure on current and future living donors with comorbidities
which are relative contraindications to donation”;
 “[O]rgans which on the whole are transplantable with fewer operative
and immunologic complications as well as vastly improved long-term
outcomes”;
 “[T]he leisure of time to carefully undertake all forms of vendor screening,
organs from deceased donors are procured, screened and allocated
under nontrivial time pressure”.39

IV. INCREASING THE SUPPLY OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION
The primary premise for those who wish to change the altruistic basis of
organ donation to a model where living donors are provided financial
incentives is the ever increasing size of the wait list and the rate of death for
those who are waiting on the list.
One of the most successful efforts to increase the supply of deceased
donor organs has been the Health Resources and Services Administration’s
(“HRSA”) Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative.40 The number of

39. Hippen Testimony, supra note 12.
40. Organ Donation: Utilizing Public Policy and Technology to Strengthen Organ Donor
Programs: Before the Subcomm. on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives of the
H. Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of James
Burdick, M.D., Dir., Div. of Transplantation, Healthcare Sys. Bureau, Health Res. and Servs.
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.), at www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/09/
t20070925a.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Burdick Statement].
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organ donors per month in the United States has grown at an
unprecedented rate since the inception of HRSA’s Organ Donation
Organ donation
Breakthrough Collaborative in September 2003.41
increased nineteen percent for the combined collaborative periods from
October 2003 through May 2006 compared to the same time period preCollaborative.42 Recent national data indicates that even greater increases
in organ recovery and transplantation are possible under the existing
system.43
There are wide geographical variations in the number of organs that are
transplanted.44 Successful organ donation also strains a transplant center’s
ability to transplant all of the organs that are currently being recovered.45
Nevertheless, the number of patients undergoing transplantation has
increased while the number of patients on the national waiting list who died
without a transplant has been steadily decreasing.46
The rate of death on the waiting list has decreased sequentially over a
three year period from 8.6% in 2003 to 7.0% in 2005.47
2003
Patients
Ever
Waiting
During
Death
Year
Deaths Rate
106,813 9,230 8.6

2004
Patients
Ever
Waiting
During
Death
Year
Deaths Rate
114,571 9,080 7.9

2005
Patients
Ever
Waiting
During
Death
Year
Deaths Rate
123,826 8,676 7.0

41. Teresa J. Shafer et al., Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative: Increasing
Organ Donation Through System Redesign, CRITICAL CARE NURSE, Apr. 2006, at 33, 46-47 &
fig.5.
42. Data on file with authors.
43. See Elizabeth M. Duke, Adm’r, Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Remarks to Organ
Donation Breakthrough Collaborative Meeting (Dec. 9, 2004), at http://archive.hrsa.gov/
newsroom/releases/2004speeches/organ-donation-Dec9.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009)
(discussing the productivity and success of Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative).
44. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VARIATION IN
ORGAN DONATION AMONG TRANSPLANT CENTERS 1 (2003), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/
reports/oei-01-02-00210.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
45. See generally ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK/SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY
OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT tbls. 2.12-3.18 (2007), available at
www.optn.org/AR2007/download_instruction.htm (follow link for “Download 2007 Annual
Report”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (showing that the percentage of transplant organs
recovered and utilized has slowly decreased over the past decade).
46. See generally id. at tbl. 1.6 (showing that the rate of patients on the waiting list who
died without a transplant has generally decreased from 1997 to 2006).
47. Data on file with authors.
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These developments occurred during a period when there were no financial
incentives to increase the potential number of donors in the United States.
There is no data to suggest that the results that have been achieved would
have been enhanced by financial incentives.
A.

Removal of Disincentives to Donation

Mr. Linford’s proposed solution raises several questions and concerns.
It may be more prudent to attempt to increase the number of living kidney
donors by removing disincentives to living donation. One such disincentive
is that a donor may fear that he or she will lose health insurance coverage
due to his or her status as a donor. A proposal currently being discussed
among transplant surgeons would call for Medicare to provide lifetime
coverage to persons who donate a kidney as a way to remove that
disincentive and protect donors.48 Another program now being piloted by
the HRSA provides reimbursement for travel and subsistence costs on a
needs basis.49 An additional barrier for many is the loss of time from work
and the potential of lost wages. Reimbursement of such costs can make a
donor whole rather than rewarding them for the donation as a scholarship
program would do.
The distinction between removing disincentives and reimbursing costs
incurred as opposed to rewarding someone for kidney donation is not
insignificant. The motivation of the donor becomes a crucial consideration
with the provision of a financial incentive calling into question whether the
donor’s desire to receive the financial gain overrides his or her willingness to
be truthful during the pre-donation medical and psychosocial evaluation.
Some transplant physicians express concern that such incentives put pressure
on the doctor-patient relationship by diminishing the ever important element
of trust. Regardless, the transplant community is “duty bound to seek an
acceptable remedy for those patients who, in their desperation, expose
themselves to unanticipated danger, and their donors to exploitation.”50
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Linford proposes an interesting solution to bridge the gap between
the growing demand for donor organs and the available supply provided
under the current altruism-based system. Any proposal for financial
48. See NATCO, THE ORGANIZATION FOR TRANSPLANT PROFESSIONALS, LIVING DONOR
HEALTH CARE COVERAGE, INSURABILITY AND FOLLOW-UP: POSITION STATEMENT (2006), available
at www.natco1.org/public_policy/documents/LivingDonorInsurability.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2009) NATCO offers counseling and medical management for transplant patients and their
families. Id.
49. Burdick Statement, supra note 40, at 3.
50. Danovitch, supra note 11, at 463 (citation omitted).
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incentives in general, and a higher education scholarship incentive in
particular, will stimulate ethical and moral arguments both in favor and in
opposition and will have numerous operational challenges to overcome,
assuming that the present law prohibiting financial consideration for donor
organs is amended to permit such a program. In addition, significant
questions remain about the impact of financial incentives for living kidney
donors and its effect on the existing rates of deceased donor and living
donation.

